Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno (bernardo@uma.es) and Salvador Barberà (salvador.barbera@uab.cat)

No 893, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study a notion of non-manipulability by groups, based on the idea that only some agreements among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. Our main non-recursive definition turns out to be equivalent, in our context, to the requirement that truthful preference revelation should be a strong coalition-proof equilibrium, as recursively defined by Peleg and Sudholter (1998,1999). We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules separating those that satisfy it from those that do not for a large family of public good decision problems.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; credibility; Voting.; group strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Immunity to credible deviations from the truth (2017)
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