Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

No 894, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.

Keywords: stability; matching; mechanisms; substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability (2017)
Working Paper: Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (2017)
Working Paper: Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:894

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