Large vs. Continuum Assignment Economies: Efficiency and Envy-Freeness

Marek Pycia and Antonio Miralles

No 950, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Continuum models are often used to study large finite assignment economies. However, some subtleties must be taken into account. We show that in the large finite random assignment problem without transfers, Competitive Equilibrium with vanishing income differences does not asymptotically characterize the set of efficient and envy-free random assignment profiles. This is in sharp contrast with the continuum model counterpart (Ashlagi and Shi, 2015). The problem is driven by the failure of local non-satiation inherent in no-transfer assignment.

Keywords: efficiency; competitive equilibrium from equal incomes; random assignments; envy-freeness; convergence failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/950-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:950

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().