Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index Without the Efficiency Axiom

Ezra Einy () and Ori Haimanko ()
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Ezra Einy: Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

No 1004, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that the Shapley-Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the e¢ ciency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker require- ment that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy

Keywords: Simple Games; Shapley-Shubik Power Index; Effciency Axiom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1004.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1004

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