CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS

Aner Sela and Reut Megidish ()
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Reut Megidish: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

No 1007, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is pro?table for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.

Keywords: Multi-stage contests; All-pay auctions; Bid caps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1007.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS (2014)
Working Paper: Caps in Sequential Contests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1007

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