ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS WITH EFFORT CONSTRAINTS

Aner Sela and Eyal Erez
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Eyal Erez: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

No 1009, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a round-robin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n-1 stages each of the players competes against a different player in the Tullock contest. Each player has a limited budget of effort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the effort he exerted in the previous stages. We show that when the prize for winning (value of winning) is equal between the stages, a player's effort is weakly decreasing over the stages. We also show how the contest designer can influence the players' allocation of effort by changing the distribution of prizes between the stages. In particular, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages that balance the effort allocation such that a player exerts the same effort over the different stages. In addition, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages that maximizes the players' expected total effort.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1009.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Round-Robin Tournaments with Effort Constraints (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1009

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