STRATEGIC AND SOCIAL PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME

Ro'i Zultan

No 1107, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: Pre-play face-to-face communication is known to facilitate cooperation. Various explanations exist for this effect, varying in their dependence on the strategic content of the communication. Previous studies have found similar communication effects regardless of whether strategic communication is available. These results were so far taken to support a social-preferences based explanation of the communication effects. The current experiment provides a replication and extension of previous results to show that different processes come into play, depending on the communication protocol. Speci cally, pre-play communication in an ultimatum game was either restricted to nongame- related content or unrestricted. The results show that strategic, but not social, communication affects responders' strategies. Thus, the existing results are cast in a new light. I conclude that pre-play communication effects may be mediated by qualitatively di erent processes, depending on the social context.

JEL-codes: C90 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1107.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1107

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