Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der "incentive" Struktur einer Politikinstanz, eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch "pooling equilibria" oder "separating equilibria"

Volker Bieta
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Volker Bieta: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 178, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Date: 2017-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger
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