Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: approximate (NTU) cores in large economies

Beth Allen
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Beth Allen: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 217, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Date: 2017-04-04
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