Coalition formation in the Airport Problem

Mahmoud Farrokhi
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Mahmoud Farrokhi: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 416, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Cooperative games; Stable coalition; Shapley value; Airport Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-net
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