Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games

Linda Sass
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Linda Sass: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 478, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games.

Keywords: Rectangularity; Kuhn's Theorem; Strategic Ambiguity; Extensive Form Ellsberg Games; Knightian Uncertainty in Games; Objective Ambiguity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2014-04-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2674088/2901849 First Version, 2013 (application/x-download)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:478

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