Aggregation of Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preferences: Arrovian impossibility results

Frederik Herzberg

No 488, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (Economic Theory, 48:341–375, 2011) have recently proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preference orderings. This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences — and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory (in the sense of mathematical logic), is employed.

Keywords: impossibility result; Arrow’s theorem; ultrafilter; Arrovian social choice; Knightian uncertainty; expectedutility; ambiguity; Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preferences; ultraproduct (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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