Uncertain acts in games

Frank Riedel

No 571, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This text reviews a recent approach to modeling "radically uncertain" behavior in strategic interactions. By rigorously rooting the approach in decision theory, we provide a foundation for applications of Knightian uncertainty in mechanism design, principal agent and moral hazard models. We discuss critical assessments and provide alternative interpretations of the new equilibria in terms of equilibrium in beliefs, and as a boundedly rational equilibrium in the sense of a population equilibrium. We also discuss the purification of equilibria in the spirit of Harsanyi.

Keywords: Knightian Uncertainty in Games; Strategic Ambiguity; Ellsberg Games; Purification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2017-03-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909171/2909172 First Version, 2017 (application/x-download)

Related works:
Journal Article: Uncertain Acts in Games (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:571

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().