A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
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Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 584, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.

Keywords: Finitely Repeated Games; Pure Strategy; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium; Limit Perfect Folk Theorem; Discount Factor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2018-08-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2930382/2930383 First Version, 2018 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:584

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