Cooperation, Correlation and Competition in Ergodic $N$-Player Games and Mean-Field Games of Singular Controls: A Case Study

Federico Cannerozzi and Giorgio Ferrari
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Federico Cannerozzi: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Giorgio Ferrari: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 691, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We consider ergodic symmetric $N$-player and mean-field games of singular control in both cooperative and competitive settings. The state process dynamics of a representative player follow geometric Brownian motion, controlled additively through a nondecreasing process. Agents aim to maximize a long-time average reward functional with instantaneous profit of power type. The game shows strategic complementarities, in that the marginal profit function is increasing with respect to the dynamic average of the states of the other players, when $N

Keywords: mean-field games; $N$-player games; singular stochastic control; ergodic reward; Nash equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; coarse correlated equilibrium; strategic complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2024-04-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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