Coarse correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games

Indrajit Ray (rayi1@cardiff.ac.uk) and Sonali Sen Gupta

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simplesymmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

Keywords: Duopoly; Coarse Correlation; Simple devices; Sunspots (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:11-14

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