Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets

Simon MacKenzie, Manfred Kerber and Colin Rowat

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Keywords: pillage games; cooperative game theory; core; stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://repec.cal.bham.ac.uk/pdf/13-07.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Pillage games with multiple stable sets (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:13-07

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