Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game

Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray () and Sonali Sen Gupta

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We consider coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) for the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that CCE can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential games. We compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a CCE involving only two pure strategy profiles, and the efficiency gain is small.

Keywords: Coarse correlated equilibrium; Abatement game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://repec.cal.bham.ac.uk/pdf/13-11.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game (2014)
Working Paper: Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:13-11

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