Platform lending and innovation

Leonardo Gambacorta, Leonardo Madio and Bruno Maria Parigi

No 1142, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: We analyse the impact of platform lending on innovation and e-commerce vendors' surplus. The platform generates revenues from both lending and marketplace fees, and can use lending to price discriminate vendors, thereby leading to higher marketplace fees and below-market interest rates. While platform lending can encourage innovation by providing access to subsidised credit, it can harm vendors who do not have financial needs. A sufficient condition for platform lending to be welfare-enhancing is that innovators would not receive funding from banks otherwise. However, if innovators would receive funding from banks, platform lending may reduce the overall vendor surplus. Cream skimming arises when the platform has better information than the bank about the prospects of the innovators' projects. To address the potential negative effects of platform lending on vendors' surplus, we also explore the impact of different regulatory instruments.

Keywords: platform lending; big tech; online platforms; credit; innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 L86 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-fdg, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-mic and nep-pay
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Related works:
Working Paper: Platform Lending and Innovation (2023)
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