Bank capital shock propagation via syndicated interconnectedness

Makoto Nirei, Julian Caballero and Vladyslav Sushko

No 484, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: Loan syndication increases bank interconnectedness through co-lending relationships. We study the financial stability implications of such dependency on syndicate partners in the presence of shocks to banks' capital. Model simulations in a network setting show that such shocks can produce rare events in this market when banks have shared loan exposures while also relying on a common risk management tool such as value-at-risk (VaR). This is because a withdrawal of a bank from a syndicate can cause ripple effects through the market, as the loan arranger scrambles to commit more of its own funds by also pulling back from other syndicates or has to dissolve the syndicate it had arranged. However, simulations also show that the core-periphery structure observed in the empirical network may reduce the probability of such contagion. In addition, simulations with tighter VaR constraints show banks taking on less risk ex-ante.

Keywords: Syndicated lending; systemic risk; network externalities; value at risk; bank capital shocks; rare event risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-net and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bank Capital Shock Propagation via Syndicated Interconnectedness (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:biswps:484

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