The pricing of carbon risk in syndicated loans: which risks are priced and why?
Torsten Ehlers,
Frank Packer and
Kathrin de Greiff
No 946, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements
Abstract:
Do banks price the risks of climate policy change? Combining syndicated loan data with carbon intensity data (CO2 emissions relative to revenue) of borrowers across a wide range of industries, we find a significant "carbon premium" since the Paris Agreement. The loan risk premium related to CO2 emission intensity is apparent across industries and broader than that due simply to "stranded assets" in fossil fuel or other carbon-intensive industries. The price of risk, however, appears to be relatively low given the material risks faced by borrowers. Only carbon emissions directly caused by the firm (scope 1) are priced, and not the overall carbon footprint including indirect emissions. "Green" banks do not appear to price carbon risk differently from other banks.
Keywords: environmental policy; climate policy risk; transition risk; loan pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 Q01 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work946.pdf Full PDF document (application/pdf)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work946.htm (text/html)
Related works:
Chapter: The pricing of carbon risk in syndicated loans: which risks are priced and why? (2022) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Journal Article: The pricing of carbon risk in syndicated loans: Which risks are priced and why? (2022) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:biswps:946
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin Fessler (webmaster@bis.org).