The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information

Nava Kahana (), Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan
Additional contact information
Nava Kahana: Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University,IZA, Bonn
Yosef Mealem: Netanya Academic College, The School of Banking & Finance Netanya, Israel

No 2009-14, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Keywords: indivisible project; single beneficiary; multiple-cost bearers; unilateral information; efficient and fair implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-ppm
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple‐Cost‐Single‐Benefit” Projects under Unilateral Information (2009)
Working Paper: The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-14

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