Self-Regulation Systems for NPO Coordination: Strenghts and Weaknesses of Label and Umbrella Mechanisms

Astrid Similon

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2015, vol. 86, issue 1, 89-104

Abstract: The rise of the non-profit sector and the increasing competition for funds among its members has increased the need for more transparency, accountability and coordination in fundraising activities. In some countries, self-regulation has appeared to be the most effective way of meeting these demands and two types of systems have emerged: the labels and the umbrella organizations. This paper analyses their emergence as well as their functioning through four cases studies and highlights their strengths and weaknesses. It shows that despite its willingness, there still remain some gaps that might prevent this sector from achieving those goals.

Date: 2015
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