LONG‐TERM AND SHORT‐TERM CONTRACT IN A MIXED MARKET*

Akira Nishimori and Hikaru Ogawa

Australian Economic Papers, 2005, vol. 44, issue 3, 275-289

Abstract: With a two‐period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long‐term or short‐term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short‐term contract while private firm makes a long‐term contract.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.2005.00265.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:44:y:2005:i:3:p:275-289

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