CEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms

Yang Wang, Yifei Zhang, Xiao Chang and Wei Kang

Business Strategy and the Environment, 2024, vol. 33, issue 3, 1887-1905

Abstract: This paper examines CEO tenure's impact on the environmental fraud committed by listed Chinese family firms from the year 2012 to 2019. Using a bivariate probit model, we provide robust evidence that CEO tenure is positively related to the environmental fraud commission, indicating that longer‐serving CEOs are more likely to violate environmental regulations and to commit fraud in the family firms. Besides, when there is a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO tenure is negatively related to the environmental fraud commission but positively related to fraud detection. Moreover, when there is a greater proportion of family members in senior positions, CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Our additional analysis finds that compared to non‐family professional CEOs, family CEOs are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Overall, our results call for the introduction of CEO tenure limits and the increased recruitment of independent directors in family firms.

Date: 2024
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