 Reward or punishment? The impact of heterogeneous environmental regulatory intervention on the firm market valueLihua Sun, Chunguang Bai and Joseph Sarkis Business Strategy and the Environment, 2024, vol. 33, issue 5, 4004-4023 Abstract: Environmental regulations are important organizational strategic drivers. Environmental regulatory mechanisms include “carrots” or “sticks”—they can be incentive or coercion‐based. This study empirically investigates stock market reactions to various environmental regulatory mechanisms. Using a sample of 334 environmental regulatory events reported by 212 listed Chinese firms between 2010 and 2020, we find that monetary reward has a greater positive market reaction towards governmental reward than non‐monetary reward. We also find that governmental operational disruption penalties have a greater negative market reaction than operational non‐disruption penalties. Governmental levels of the environmental regulation implementation subject do not play a moderating role in the relationship between governmental regulations and firm market value. These findings provide various policy and organizational insights as businesses seek to meet legitimacy gains in response environmental regulatory mechanisms. Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:bstrat:v:33:y:2024:i:5:p:4004-4023 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Business Strategy and the Environment is currently edited by Richard Welford More articles in Business Strategy and the Environment from Wiley Blackwell |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.