Imperfect Capital Mobility and Local Government Behaviour in a Two-Period Economy

Hikaru Ogawa

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2000, vol. 52, issue 2, 151-66

Abstract: One clear result in the tax competition literature is that, when head taxes on immobile residents are available, the optimal capital tax rate for local government is zero. However, zero tax rate, when resident taxes are available, is incompatible with the phenomenon actually observed. In most countries, local governments use capital taxes as policy variables for choosing a nonzero tax rate. This paper presents a model of a two-period economy with imperfect mobile capital to explain the behaviour of local government providing capital subsidies on capital. It further examines an equilibrium tax rate where local government's objectives include Niskanen-type revenue-maximizing. Copyright 2000 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Date: 2000
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