Technology selling and innovation with bargaining

Swapnendu Banerjee (Bandyopadhyay), Yuanzhu Lu () and Sougata Poddar ()

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2021, vol. 73, issue 1, 100-107

Abstract: We examine when the price of technology is found through bargaining between the seller and the buyer and explore its effect on the innovation incentive. Selling the technology is preferred to licensing for the innovating firm. The possibility of selling increases the incentive for innovation compared to licensing for a range of high‐cost innovation, but reduces the incentive for a range of low‐cost innovation.

Date: 2021
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https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12235

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