Do voluntary commitment mechanisms improve welfare? The effect of mandatory and voluntary oaths in a social dilemma

Brent J. Davis and Tarek Jaber‐Lopez

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2023, vol. 75, issue 2, 525-540

Abstract: We investigate whether oaths can enforce property rights in a social dilemma and increase welfare. We examine the impact of mandatory and voluntary oaths in a laboratory experiment where individuals can produce wealth, protect accumulated wealth, and take wealth from others. Individuals are more productive when oaths are mandatory compared to a no‐oath environment. Subjects’ voluntary signing oaths behave similarly to those who sign a mandatory oath. When the oath is voluntary, nonoath‐taking individuals engage in nonproductive behavior, negating the positive impact from the voluntary oath. Our results show that altering commitment mechanisms can result in varying welfare levels.

Date: 2023
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