INFLATION STABILIZATION AND NOMINAL ANCHORS

Guillermo Calvo and Carlos Vegh

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1994, vol. 12, issue 2, 35-45

Abstract: This paper analyzes the choice of a nominal anchor in disinflation programs in chronic inflation countries. Both theory and evidence suggest several conclusions. (i) The recessionary effects associated with disinflation appear in the early stages of money‐based programs but only in the late stages of exchange rate‐based programs. (ii) Lack of credibility is more disruptive under fixed exchange rates than under floating exchange rates. (iii) Attempting to pursue a disinflationary policy while maintaining a given level of the real exchange rate is likely to be self‐defeating. (iv) A high degree of currency substitution favors the exchange rate as the nominal anchor.

Date: 1994
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1994.tb00421.x

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Working Paper: Inflation Stabilization and Nominal Anchors (1993)
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