Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms

Yu Wen, Kami Rwegasira and Jan Bilderbeek

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2002, vol. 10, issue 2, 75-83

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:corgov:v:10:y:2002:i:2:p:75-83

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=0964-8410&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

Corporate Governance: An International Review is currently edited by William Judge

More articles in Corporate Governance: An International Review from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().