Continuity and Change in Corporate Governance: comparing Germany and Japan

Gregory Jackson and Andreas Moerke

Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2005, vol. 13, issue 3, 351-361

Abstract: Germany and Japan are often seen deviating from an economic model of shareholder control and thereby as being similar by virtue of their mutual contrast with the US. Given the common challenges for bank‐based and stakeholder‐oriented models of corporate governance, Germany–Japan comparison seems particularly timely. This article provides an introductory overview and analysis for the Special Issue by comparing recent developments in corporate law reform, banking and finance, and employment in Germany and Japan. While rejecting arguments for international convergence, we discuss this evidence of simultaneous continuity and change in corporate governance as a potential form of hybridisation of national models or renegotiation of stakeholder coalitions in German and Japanese firms. One consequence is the growing diversity of firm‐level corporate governance practices within national systems.

Date: 2005
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