A Family Member or Professional Management? The Choice of a CEO and Its Impact on Performance
Shu‐hui Lin and
Shing‐yang Hu
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2007, vol. 15, issue 6, 1348-1362
Abstract:
In this study, we explore what kinds of family firms are more likely to have a family CEO or professional CEO, and investigate the performance of CEOs from different backgrounds. The results show that firms with low requirements in managerial skills and a high potential for expropriation are more likely to choose a CEO from the controlling family (nepotism). Our investigation, furthermore, shows that when a firm requires high managerial skills, using a professional CEO can help firm performance, especially if the family has low cash‐flow rights and weak control. When there is large opportunity for expropriation in a family firm, the firm's performance will be better if the CEO is a family member and the family has highly persuasive cash‐flow rights.
Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00650.x
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:corgov:v:15:y:2007:i:6:p:1348-1362
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