Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?

Alexander Lundberg

Economic Inquiry, 2024, vol. 62, issue 2, 650-674

Abstract: The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.

Date: 2024
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