Self‐reporting and Market Structure

Matthew Rablen and Andrew Samuel

Economica, 2021, vol. 88, issue 351, 782-808

Abstract: Many regulators utilize self‐reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self‐reporting within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self‐reporting (relative to no‐reporting) for a welfare‐maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control only the audit probability and fine, then whether compliance rises or falls upon implementing self‐reporting depends on the level of competition. Second, if the regulator can also control the market size, then the welfare‐maximizing policy entails self‐reporting but with more competition and lower compliance than under no‐reporting.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12365

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:88:y:2021:i:351:p:782-808

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().