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Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan and Qiang Wu ()

Financial Management, 2015, vol. 44, issue 3, 547-581

Abstract: type="main">

We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance. This relation is driven by professors without administrative positions. We also find that academic directors play an important governance role through their advising and monitoring functions. Specifically, our results show that the presence of academic directors is associated with greater acquisition performance, a higher number of patents and citations, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and higher CEO forced turnover-performance sensitivity. Overall, our results indicate that academic directors are valuable advisors and effective monitors and firms benefit from having academic directors.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Professors in the boardroom and their impact on corporate governance and firm performance (2014) Downloads
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