Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems

Juan D. Moreno‐Ternero, Min‐Hung Tsay and Chun‐Hsien Yeh
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 18, issue 1, 92-102

Abstract: We follow the Nash program to provide strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is inspired by an axiomatization of the TAL family of rules exploiting the properties of consistency together with certain degrees of lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Bilateral negotiations of our game follow the spirit of those bounds. By means of consistency, we then extend the bilateral negotiations to an arbitrary number of creditors.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12301

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Working Paper: Strategic justifications of the TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems (2021)
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