Synchronization under uncertainty

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 2, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: A decision‐maker needs to schedule several activities that take uncertain time to complete and are only valuable together. Some activities are bound to be finished earlier than others, therefore resuting in waiting costs. We show how to schedule activities optimally, how to give independent agents performing them incentives that implement the efficient schedule, and how to form teams in the presence of uncertainty. The present paper offers insights into important economic decisions such as planning large projects and coordinating product development activities.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2006.0021.x

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