Advances on Stackelberg open‐loop and feedback strategies

Koji Shimomura and Danyang Xie

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 4, issue 1, 115-133

Abstract: In this paper, we study a familiar type of dynamic games called “common‐property resource games” to establish the following results. First, the Stackelberg equilibrium may not exist in some cases, with open‐loop strategies as well as with feedback strategies. Second, an explicit example is given to show that under feedback strategies, the best linear strategy on the part of the leader is inferior to a nonlinear strategy so that it is dangerous to confine our search to the Stackelberg equilibrium in the space of linear functions. Most importantly, we establish an “Implementation Lemma”, which allows us to develop one methodology to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium with feedback strategies when the equilibrium is assumed to exist.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00071.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:115-133

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1742-7355

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by Kazuo Nishimura and Makoto Yano

More articles in International Journal of Economic Theory from The International Society for Economic Theory
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().