The Revolving Door and Access to the European Commission: Does the Logic of Influence Prevail?

Sharon S. Belli and Jan Beyers

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2024, vol. 62, issue 1, 186-204

Abstract: This article analyses to what extent and under which conditions revolving door practices relate to access to the European Commission (EC). The revolving door hypothesis is analysed by combining two data sources: a dataset with publicly available records about the meetings between interest organizations and senior EC officials and evidence collected through the Comparative Interest Group‐survey (CIG‐survey). It is especially in professionalized organizations, where staff and organizational leadership dominate, that we observe a significant positive relationship between revolving door practices and access. In contrast, the extent to which the membership decides on political positioning and advocacy strategies has no impact on the relationship between revolving door and access. These results show that the revolving door is primarily connected with a logic of influence, implying that revolvers are especially advantageous for professionalized organizations.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13486

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:62:y:2024:i:1:p:186-204

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().