 Indicative Planning and France's Backstage Contribution to Eurozone GovernanceIan Alexander Lovering Journal of Common Market Studies, 2024, vol. 62, issue 1, 91-107 Abstract: This article examines the history of indicative planning in France to challenge conceptions of Eurozone governance. French planning is seen as a road not taken in Europe. Instead, the Eurozone is conceptualised through planning's antagonist – German ordoliberalism. Key features of this are rules‐based austerity and price stability pursued by an independent central bank. Scholars have, however, recognised that Eurozone governance exceeds ordoliberalism through a logic of integration oriented towards coordination rather than convergence and a governance rationality of performance management rather than legal enforcement. I analyse the historiography of indicative planning to argue that it provides a useful conceptual vantage point to understand these features of Eurozone governance. Highlighting the legacy of planning provides an alternative perspective on Eurozone politics. It shifts attention from the German‐led legal constraints imposed on national governments to how techniques of planning have suited French state desires for international coordination without supranational domination. Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:62:y:2024:i:1:p:91-107 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell |
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