ANTI‐DUAL OF ECONOMIC COALITIONAL TU GAMES*

Takayuki Oishi and Mikio Nakayama

The Japanese Economic Review, 2009, vol. 60, issue 4, 560-566

Abstract: Some well‐known coalitional TU (transferable utility) games applied to specific economic problems are shown to be connected through the relation defined as the anti‐dual. Solutions such as the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus of anti‐dual games are obtained straightforwardly from original games.

Date: 2009
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