Patent Licensing Under Strategic Delegation

Ana Saracho

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2002, vol. 11, issue 2, 225-251

Abstract: The modern corporation is characterized both by a separation of ownership from management and by managerial incentives that often include strategic elements in addition to the standard incentive elements. Despite the importance of these two features in the agency and corporate‐governance literatures, they are absent in the treatment of the firm in the patent‐licensing literature. The analysis in this paper shows how, by simply taking into account these two features of the modern corporation, it is possible to offer a new explanation for the use of royalties in licensing agreements.

Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00225.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:11:y:2002:i:2:p:225-251

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().