Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market

Chunyang Wang

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2024, vol. 33, issue 3, 686-705

Abstract: This paper examines one million land transactions and firm census data sets to determine the effect of market concentration on entry deterrence in China from 2006 to 2013. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index leads to a one standard deviation decrease in local government‐designated industrial land sales to nonlocal firms and to a 2.9 standard deviation increase in land cost. Further evidence suggests that firms with high market power lobby their local governments to deter the entry of nonlocal firms.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12591

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:33:y:2024:i:3:p:686-705

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().