Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
James S. Ang,
Rebel Cole and
James Wuh Lin
Journal of Finance, 2000, vol. 55, issue 1, 81-106
Abstract:
We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency‐cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (612)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00201
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:55:y:2000:i:1:p:81-106
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery (contentdelivery@wiley.com).