Choosing to Disagree: Endogenous Dismissiveness and Overconfidence in Financial Markets

Snehal Banerjee, Jesse Davis and Naveen Gondhi

Journal of Finance, 2024, vol. 79, issue 2, 1635-1695

Abstract: The psychology literature documents that individuals derive current utility from their beliefs about future events. We show that, as a result, investors in financial markets choose to disagree about both private information and price information. When objective price informativeness is low, each investor dismisses the private signals of others and ignores price information. In contrast, when prices are sufficiently informative, heterogeneous interpretations arise endogenously: most investors ignore prices, while the rest condition on it. Our analysis demonstrates how observed deviations from rational expectations (e.g., dismissiveness, overconfidence) arise endogenously, interact with each other, and vary with economic conditions.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13311

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