Partial Privatization of State Holding Corporations

Quan Dong, Juan Carlos Bárcena†Ruiz and María Begoña Garzón

Manchester School, 2018, vol. 86, issue 1, 119-138

Abstract: We consider a state holding corporation with two plants that may produce complementary or substitute goods and that competes with one or two private firms. We find that the government partially privatizes the two plants of the state holding corporation and is indifferent between selling them partially to a single investor and to different investors. However, in the former case the government retains a greater (smaller) stake in the state corporation if goods are substitutes (complements).

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12200

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:86:y:2018:i:1:p:119-138

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().