Trade, industrial, and privatization policies with endogenous market structure

Shih‐Shen Chen, Po‐Sheng Ko, Jen‐Yao Lee and Chien‐Shu Tsai

Manchester School, 2024, vol. 92, issue 5, 494-506

Abstract: This study finds that in an international mixed oligopoly at free entry equilibrium, social welfare under import tariff cum privatization is higher than output subsidy cum privatization, and the dual subsidy‐tariff policy cum privatization degenerates into a single tariff policy cum privatization. The reason is that an output subsidy or the dual subsidy‐tariff policy will incentivize domestic private firms to enter the free‐entry equilibrium. Thus, the number of domestic firms with free entry is excessive, and social welfare deteriorates. A privatization policy is pivotal in the long run and is still more effective than a single subsidy policy.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12477

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:92:y:2024:i:5:p:494-506

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().