Knowledge distance and R&D collaboration in Cournot oligopoly

Mauro Caminati

Metroeconomica, 2021, vol. 72, issue 1, 57-81

Abstract: A Cournot collaboration game is complemented with the hypothesis that the cost of R&D collaboration depends on firm’s directed knowledge distance with respect to potential R&D partners. The further hypothesis that directed distance may be non‐uniform and pair‐wise asymmetric reconciles theoretical predictions with qualitative evidence about concentration and multiplicity of components in industrial R&D networks. The welfare properties of sparse stable networks are also affected.

Date: 2021
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