 Design of Covid‐19 testing queuesLuyi Yang, Shiliang Cui and Zhongbin Wang Production and Operations Management, 2022, vol. 31, issue 5, 2204-2221 Abstract: In the event of a virus outbreak such as Covid‐19, testing is key. However, long waiting lines at testing facilities often discourage individuals from getting tested. This paper utilizes queueing‐game‐theoretic models to study how testing facilities should set scheduling and pricing policies to incentivize individuals to test, with the goal to identify the most cases of infection. Our findings are as follows. First, under the first‐in‐first‐out discipline (FIFO), the common practice of making testing free attracts the most testees but may not catch the most cases. Charging a testing fee may surprisingly increase case detection. Second, even though people who show symptoms are more likely to carry the virus, prioritizing these individuals over asymptomatic ones (another common practice) may let more cases go undetected than FIFO testing does. Third, we characterize the optimal scheduling and pricing policy. To maximize case detection, testing can be made free but one should also (partially) prioritize individuals with symptoms when testing demand is high and switch to (partially) prioritize the asymptomatic when testing demand is moderately low. Date: 2022 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:popmgt:v:31:y:2022:i:5:p:2204-2221 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Production and Operations Management is currently edited by Kalyan Singhal More articles in Production and Operations Management from Production and Operations Management Society |
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